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INTRODUCTION
As the federal agency tasked with ensuring drug safety,1 the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) is the single most important regulator in the pharmaceutical field. Currently, a vigorous debate exists
over whether it should be the only regulator. Critics of the tort system
see products liability suits as an additional, pernicious source of regulation. They argue that juries should not be allowed to second-guess
† Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank James O’Reilly and Catherine Sharkey for thoughtful comments on a prior draft. I am grateful to Christopher
Robbins for research assistance, Ronald Day and the staff of the Biddle Law Library for
assistance in obtaining sources, and Jeffrey Baldwin, Brendan Mahan, Kenneth Meyer, and
the editors of the Cornell Law Review for their editorial work. Errors, of course, are mine.
1
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 903, 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2000).
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the FDA’s drug-safety determinations, and they contend that the risk
of tort liability deters useful pharmaceutical innovations.2 The current FDA agrees. Although the FDA, under past administrations, saw
itself as setting only a floor for drug safety—such that, for example,
state tort law could permissibly impose additional requirements on a
drug manufacturer3—the current FDA views itself as setting both a
floor and a ceiling.4 Defenders of the tort system, however, point out
that many risks become apparent only after a drug has been widely
used for some time; in contrast to the rigorous scrutiny of pre-marketing review, the FDA’s “post-marketing surveillance” program—the
means by which the FDA monitors a drug’s safety after its approval—is
woefully inadequate.5 The tort system, they contend, gives plaintiffs’
lawyers an incentive to collect and analyze drug safety data in their
search for valid tort claims, and the tort discovery process can bring to
light new evidence concerning a drug’s risks.6
This debate has focused a great deal of attention on the issue of
preemption. Tort critics contend that FDA approval of a drug or
medical device should preempt state-law tort claims concerning the
approved product.7 Under the current preemption doctrine, the success of their argument depends on the type of claim and on the level
of FDA scrutiny that the product received. For example, if a plaintiff
asserts that the defendant violated FDA requirements, FDA approval
does not preempt the plaintiff’s state-law tort claim.8 If, instead, the
plaintiff asserts that the defendant secured product approval by perpetrating a fraud on the FDA, FDA approval will generally preempt the
plaintiff’s state-law tort claim.9 In the latter context, however, FDA
2
See, e.g., Amicus Brief at 25–26, Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir.
2004) (No. 02-4597) (arguing that “[s]tate common law tort actions threaten the statutory
framework for the regulation of medical devices” and that the threat of such actions “can
harm the public health by retarding research and development”).
3
See Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997) (article by FDA’s former-Chief Counsel stating that “FDA product
approval and state tort liability usually operate independently, each providing a significant,
yet distinct, layer of consumer protection”).
4
See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006).
5
See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 600–06
(2005).
6
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 571 (2002) (“Private attorneys are
adept at uncovering evidence of fraud and misrepresentation in the discovery that precedes common law trials, and they are willing to spend the resources necessary to copy and
organize documents, take depositions, and fight the company’s efforts to resist
discovery.”).
7
See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
8
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996).
9
See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001).
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approval might not preempt the plaintiff’s state-law tort claim if the
plaintiff makes the fraud-on-the-FDA assertion not as an element of
the plaintiff’s claim but only as a way to avoid a state-law regulatorycompliance defense.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2007
to resolve a circuit split concerning this question as applied to Michigan law, but divided 4–4 (and thus created no precedent).11 Furthermore, although claims challenging the safety of a medical device that
the FDA has approved through its relatively streamlined “substantial
equivalence” process are not preempted,12 claims concerning devices
that the FDA has approved through its more rigorous “premarket approval” process are preempted to the extent that they assert that the
defendant violated duties imposed by state law that “are ‘different
10
A regulatory-compliance defense provides that a defendant’s compliance with the
relevant agency’s regulatory requirements provides a defense to tort liability. For example,
a Michigan statute provides that, subject to certain exceptions,
[i]n a product liability action against a manufacturer or seller, a product
that is a drug is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the drug was approved for safety and efficacy
by the United States food and drug administration, and the drug and its
labeling were in compliance with the United States food and drug administration’s approval at the time the drug left the control of the manufacturer
or seller.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5). One exception to Michigan’s regulatory-compliance defense arises if the defendant
[i]ntentionally with[held] from or misrepresent[ed] to the United States
food and drug administration information concerning the drug that is required to be submitted under the federal food, drug, and cosmetic act, and
the drug would not have been approved, or the United States food and
drug administration would have withdrawn approval for the drug if the information were accurately submitted.
Id. § 600.2946(5)(a) (citation omitted).
11
See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1168 (2008) (per curiam). The
Second Circuit had held that
because Michigan law does not in fact implicate the concerns that animated
the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckman, and because Appellants’ lawsuits
depend primarily on traditional and preexisting tort sources, not at all on a
“fraud-on-the-FDA” cause of action created by state law, and only incidentally on evidence of such fraud, . . . the Michigan immunity exception is not
prohibited through preemption.
Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 98 (2d Cir. 2006), as amended Jan. 18,
2007, aff’d sub nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam). In
reaching a different holding, the Sixth Circuit previously asserted that
Buckman prohibits a plaintiff from invoking the [Michigan statutory] exceptions on the basis of state court findings of fraud on the FDA. Such a state
court proceeding would raise the same inter-branch-meddling concerns
that animated Buckman. But the same concerns do not arise when the FDA
itself determines that a fraud has been committed on the agency during the
regulatory-approval process.
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004).
For an insightful discussion of the issues presented by such fraud exceptions in state immunity statutes, see Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming June 2008).
12
See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 493–94.
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from, or in addition to’ the [duties] imposed by federal law.”13 Meanwhile, in the context of prescription drugs, the lower courts have
reached varying views concerning whether FDA approval preempts
claims that a manufacturer failed to provide appropriate warnings of a
drug’s risks.14 The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review the Vermont Supreme Court’s determination that
FDA approval did not preempt a failure-to-warn claim because the defendant could have added the warning without prior FDA approval.15
The current FDA has made clear its support for the preemption
defense. The FDA has submitted amicus briefs on behalf of the drug
industry in various products liability suits.16 And when amending its
regulations concerning prescription drug labeling, the FDA added a
“preamble,” which states that “FDA approval of labeling under the
act . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”17 However, it is
currently unclear how much weight courts will accord the preamble.18
It is also unclear whether Congress will act in this area; in 2007, Democrats in the House introduced a bill that would override the FDA’s
current position on preemption.19
While it is hard to predict the ultimate scope of the preemption
defense, it is quite possible that some types of claims will escape it.
Consequently, defendants, continuing their search for ways to privilege FDA determinations over those of lay juries, have turned to the
13

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008).
Compare Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537–38 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(finding that federal law preempted the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims) with In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 788–89 (E.D. La. 2007) (finding that federal law
did not preempt the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim).
15
See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008)
(No. 06–1249).
16
See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae The United States of America, Colacicco (Civ. No.
05-CV-05500-MMB), 2006 WL 1724170.
17
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006).
18
The Supreme Court recently avoided reaching the question of how much deference courts should give to an agency regulation asserting preemption in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007). The three dissenting Justices, who reached
the question of the regulation’s effect, asserted that “generic authorizations of rulemaking
authority . . . provide no textual foundation for [the agency’s] assertion of preemption
authority,” id. at 1583 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and argued that “when an agency purports to decide the scope of federal preemption, a healthy respect for state sovereignty
calls for something less than Chevron deference,” id. at 1584.
Meanwhile, lower courts have begun to split on the question of the preamble’s effect.
Compare McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286(JBS), 2006 WL 2819046,
at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (holding that the preamble, by itself, does not preempt) with
Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (relying in part on the preamble in holding a failure-towarn claim was preempted).
19
See Food and Drug Administration Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 2273, 110th
Cong. § 6 (2007).
14
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primary jurisdiction doctrine as an alternative.20 For example, Judge
William A. Dreier, who now practices products liability defense,21 proposes that if a court fails to find a failure-to-warn claim preempted, the
court should apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to stay the case
“until the FDA has been requested to pass upon the alleged [labeling]
misstatements and responds to the request.”22
The primary jurisdiction doctrine, if applied in this context,
would require a court hearing a products liability claim concerning an
FDA-approved product to stay the case and refer the parties to the
FDA for a determination of certain issues, including whether the
product is defective and whether a defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries. This Article considers the extent to which courts can constitutionally use the primary jurisdiction doctrine to refer to the FDA
issues arising in tort suits concerning FDA-approved drugs. Part I describes the doctrine and considers its possible use in drug products
liability suits. Parts II and III analyze the constitutionality of applying
the primary jurisdiction doctrine in such suits. Specifically, Part II addresses federal-court litigation, where the key constraints are those imposed by Article III and the Seventh Amendment. And Part III
addresses state-court litigation, where the key constraints are those imposed by the scope of the commerce power and federalism concerns
embodied in the Tenth Amendment.
I
THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
The primary jurisdiction doctrine may apply if a court faces an
issue that an administrative agency should decide in the first instance.23 The doctrine comes into play if a decision by an agency
20
See, e.g., Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053 (W.D. Wis. 2006)
(“Defendants’ first motion raises questions whether Food and Drug Administration regulations preempt plaintiff’s state common law claims and whether the court should abstain
from hearing this case in deference to the FDA’s primary jurisdiction and expertise.”).
21
Profile of William A. Dreier, http://www.nmmlaw.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=62&Itemid=29 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
22
William A. Dreier, Liability for Drug Advertising, Warnings, and Frauds, 58 RUTGERS L.
REV. 615, 644 (2006).
23
The primary jurisdiction doctrine is different from the related doctrine of administrative exhaustion. As the Supreme Court has explained:
“Exhaustion” applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. “Primary jurisdiction,” on the other
hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its views.
United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1956).
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would serve one or more of the goals of uniformity, expert technical
or policy decision making, and judicial efficiency.24 If the doctrine is
in play, the court may require the parties to seek an agency’s determination of certain issues before proceeding with the litigation.25
Courts have sometimes applied the doctrine to require litigants to
seek a determination from the FDA.26 Some case law indicates, however, that courts are less likely to apply the doctrine to tort suits for
personal injury damages.27
Courts consider various factors in deciding whether to stay an action under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Such factors include
whether the relevant issue is within judges’ normal competence28 or
whether it requires the agency’s expertise;29 whether the litigation
may subject the defendant to obligations that conflict with those imposed by the agency;30 whether the agency is already in the process of
considering the relevant issue;31 the risk of undue delay if the court
stays the suit to await the agency’s determination;32 and the type of
remedies available to the plaintiff in court and before the agency.33
The arguments typically made in support of the primary jurisdiction doctrine could be made in the context of actions concerning
FDA-regulated drugs or devices. For example, in upholding a district
court’s application of the doctrine to an action by drug makers seeking a declaratory judgment that their drugs were generally recognized
as safe and effective, and thus were not “new drugs” requiring new
drug applications,34 the Supreme Court explained:
[T]he District Court’s referral of the “new drug” and the “grandfather” issues to FDA was appropriate, as these are the kinds of issues
peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA. . . . The deter24

See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574–75 (1952).
Ordinarily, there is no statutory authority for the court itself to refer the issue to
the agency. Therefore, the court stays its proceedings and waits for a party to obtain the
agency’s ruling on the relevant issues. See, e.g., Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 n.3
(1993). Because the plaintiff may be able to continue to litigate after the agency decides
the relevant issues, the court should stay, rather than dismiss, the action to avoid any statute-of-limitations problems. See, e.g., Ryan v. ChemLawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 132 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1991).
26
See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4042 LMM, 2000 WL 1738645, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000).
27
See, e.g., Ryan, 935 F.2d at 131.
28
See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 305–06 (1976).
29
See Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 223 (2d Cir.
1995).
30
See Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1350
(D.N.M. 1995).
31
See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 532 F.2d 412, 420 (5th Cir.
1976).
32
See Am. Tel. & Tel., 46 F.3d at 225.
33
See infra notes 40–54 and accompanying text.
34
See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharms., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 647–49 (1973).
25

R
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mination whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective within the meaning of § 201(p)(1) necessarily implicates
complex chemical and pharmacological considerations. Threshold
questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative agency
are appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its
hand.35

The argument for primary jurisdiction seems strongest when a
plaintiff asks the court to order the defendant to do something that
the FDA itself might require—such as an order to notify doctors and
patients of particular information. Thus, for example, in Bernhardt v.
Pfizer, Inc., the district court applied the doctrine to a products liability
plaintiff’s request for an injunction requiring Pfizer to notify doctors
and patients of study findings regarding Cardura, a Pfizer drug.36 The
court reasoned that the FDA’s expertise was required in order to interpret the study’s findings.37 The court noted that Congress has empowered the FDA to notify doctors and patients about a drug’s risks
and to ask drug companies to alter a drug’s labeling.38 Likewise, another district court, citing Bernhardt, recently applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine in refusing to order the defendant to further notify
class members of their need to obtain a blood test.39
The nature of the relief sought can be key when a court decides
whether to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine. If the FDA could
provide the plaintiff with the relief sought, then a court may be more
likely to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine. For example, in Bernhardt, the court observed that the plaintiffs could bring a citizen petition asking the FDA to notify patients and doctors,40 which assured
that plaintiffs had an avenue of relief even if the court held that the
issue fell within the FDA’s primary jurisdiction. Moreover, the fact
that a requested action could be taken by the FDA may provide courts
with additional reasons to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine. If
statutes and regulations explicitly authorize the FDA to take a particular action, a court may take that authorization as an indication that
the issues involved in that action are committed to the agency’s expertise and judgment.41 And if both the FDA and the court may take a
particular action—such as ordering notice to class members of the
need for a medical test—applying the doctrine avoids the risk that a
35

Id. at 653–54.
Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4042 LMM, 2000 WL 1738645, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 22, 2000).
37
Id. at *2.
38
Id. at *3.
39
See In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (D.N.J. 2007)
(citing Bernhardt, 2000 WL 1738645, at *3).
40
See Bernhardt, 2000 WL 1738645, at *3 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 10.30).
41
See, e.g., In re Human Tissue Prods., 488 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
36
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court would subject a defendant to inconsistent notice obligations
(and the concomitant risk that doctors and patients would receive
multiple and possibly inconsistent notices).42 Finally, requests for injunctive relief, which invoke the court’s discretionary powers, may be
more likely than requests for monetary relief to lead to the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
Even in cases involving damages claims, courts have in some circumstances applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to require parties to submit certain issues to the FDA. In Israel v. Baxter Laboratories,
Inc., for example, a drug maker sued several of its competitors for
damages, alleging that they conspired to induce the FDA to deny approval to the plaintiffs’ drug.43 The court of appeals viewed the lawsuit as presenting two issues: whether the plaintiffs’ drug was safe and
effective, and whether the defendants conspired to induce the FDA to
deny approval.44 The court held that the first of these issues fell
squarely within the areas committed by Congress to the FDA’s expertise. Thus, the court held, the primary jurisdiction doctrine required
the district court to stay its proceedings to permit the plaintiffs to seek
a determination from the FDA.45 But, recognizing that the plaintiffs’
conspiracy allegation fell outside the FDA’s sphere of authority and
noting that the FDA could not award the plaintiffs the damages they
sought, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could reactivate their litigation after obtaining a determination from the FDA on their new drug
application and that “[i]f . . . plaintiffs do not . . . obtain full and fair
consideration by the FDA as to the safety and efficacy of their drug . . .
, they may obtain a full hearing in the District Court on all their allegations.”46 Therefore, the Israel court required referral to the FDA on
42

See id.
466 F.2d 272, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44
Id. at 280.
45
See id. at 280–82. Similarly, in Rutherford v. American Medical Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to cancer patients’ claims that defendants—
including the American Medical Association and the FDA—conspired to prevent the distribution approval of Krebiozen, a cancer drug. 379 F.2d 641, 642–43 (7th Cir. 1967). Reasoning that “an essential element of the . . . case is a showing that under the appropriate
standards, Krebiozen would be approved or exempted” and that “initial approval or exemption of a drug is within the primary jurisdiction of the FDA,” the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims, stating that “[w]ithout an attempted
good faith application for approval or exemption, we have no jurisdiction to determine
whether the FDA has illegally placed impossible or unreasonable conditions on approval
or exemption, or has made requests for information impossible to fulfill, or whether the
FDA has been dilatory, biased, or discriminatory.” Id. at 643, 645. The application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine in Rutherford was perhaps more predictable than in Israel because the sole relief that the plaintiffs sought in Rutherford was an order enjoining interference with the drug’s distribution—an order that would fall within the core of the FDA’s
own sphere of discretion. See id. at 642.
46
See Israel, 466 F.2d at 282.
43
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the issues of safety and efficacy, but also contemplated a searching
district court review of the FDA’s determinations on those issues.
Yet, other cases suggest that damages claims merit a different approach because the FDA is not empowered to award damages to a tort
claimant injured by a defective drug or device. Some courts have relied on a plaintiff’s request for damages as a reason not to apply the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.47 Likewise, some courts have indicated
that even when the elements of a tort claim implicate technical judgments—such as a drug’s safety, the adequacy of warnings, or injury
causation—those judgments are no different from the judgments required in other products liability cases, and thus do not require application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.48
In Ryan v. ChemLawn Corp., the Seventh Circuit took this view
when it reversed the district court’s application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in state-law products liability litigation arising from
the defendant’s use of pesticides that had been registered with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as required by federal law.49
Reasoning that the case required an assessment of “arcane technical
data, uniquely within the EPA’s competence,” the district court had
refused “to substitute its judgment for that of the EPA and to decide
whether the active and inert chemical ingredients in ChemLawn’s
products [were] safe for commercial use.”50 The Seventh Circuit,
however, held the primary jurisdiction doctrine inapplicable,51 and
explained that it “fail[ed] to understand what role the EPA [could]
play in [the] suit,” given that the EPA could not award the damages
sought by the plaintiff.52 The court also stressed that the case involved
“state common law causes of action and remedies that [were] not dependent on any EPA provisions,” and that it viewed the case as posing
no unusual challenges to judicial competence in light of “the tens of
47
See, e.g., Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 (W.D. Wis. 2006)
(“The FDA does not have authority to grant the compensatory or punitive damages sought
by plaintiff in this case.”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[C]ourts generally do not defer jurisdiction
where plaintiffs seek damages for injuries to their property or person.”). The Seventh
Circuit has used similar logic in refusing to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine in a
case involving the EPA:
[T]he plaintiff has dropped her claim for injunctive relief against the defendant. Therefore, hers is a claim that seeks only monetary damages, and
as both parties agree that the EPA cannot provide the plaintiff with any
form of compensatory or punitive damages, we fail to understand what role
the EPA can play in this suit nor has the district court given this court any
reason to rule otherwise.
Ryan v. ChemLawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1991).
48
See, e.g., Peters, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1057–58.
49
See Ryan, 935 F.2d at 130 & n.1.
50
Id. at 131 (quoting the district court opinion).
51
Id.
52
Id.
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thousands of personal injury suits alleging defective design or an inherent defect that are decided each year in state and federal courts.”53
Finally, the court noted an alternative way to obtain input from the
EPA: instead of applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, “[i]f the
district court believed that it needed specific information from the
EPA to decide this case, it could have asked the EPA to file an amicus
brief.”54
There is, accordingly, some reason to doubt that a court would
apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to require referral to the FDA
in a suit seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by an FDA-approved drug. But even if courts refuse to apply the doctrine in this
context, proponents might still ask Congress to mandate its application by statute. It is thus worthwhile to consider whether the Constitution would limit such a use of the doctrine.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
FEDERAL-COURT LITIGATION

IN

This Part examines whether a court’s referral to the FDA of issues
such as product safety and causation—under the primary jurisdiction
doctrine—would be constitutional.55 Two basic questions present
themselves:56 first, would referral comport with the limits imposed by
Article III, and second, would referral comport with the limits imposed by the Seventh Amendment. Part III.A answers the first question and concludes that some uses of primary jurisdiction would
probably comply with Article III. But, even assuming that the demands of Article III are met, the Seventh Amendment would pose an
independent hurdle to the use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
53

Id. at 132.
Id.
55
I touched upon this question in a prior article. See Struve, supra note 5, at 630–43
(2005). Arguments that I first made in that article are reproduced below in Part III.A and
Part III.B.
56
Another question might be: do principles of due process pose additional constraints? But the answer to this question depends on the details of the proposed system
(for example, the nature of the litigants’ opportunity to be heard in FDA proceedings on
the referred issues). For brevity’s sake, I omit further discussion of the due process constraints on the assumption that it is possible to design the primary jurisdiction process so
that due process principles impose no additional barriers beyond those set by Article III
and the Seventh Amendment. I make a similar assumption in Part III when I discuss the
constitutional framework that applies to state-court litigation.
Given that the claims at issue in this Article are state-law tort claims, one might also
argue that the referral discussed here implicates questions of federalism. But as to claims
asserted in federal court, the Court has previously rejected the argument that “the fact that
a federal agency rather than a federal Article III court initially hears the state law claim
gives rise to a cognizably greater impairment of principles of federalism.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986).
54

R
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Thus, Part II.B addresses the second question. Part II.B begins by discussing the Court’s primary jurisdiction precedents, which are silent
on the Seventh Amendment question, and then reviews some basic
outlines of Seventh Amendment doctrine. Based on this analysis, Part
II.B. concludes that the Seventh Amendment would permit the use of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine only if courts treat the FDA’s findings as, at most, prima facie evidence.
A. Article III Constraints
Article III assures life tenure and salary protection for federal
judges appointed under its authority.57 These assurances protect separation-of-powers values by insulating the federal judiciary from undue control and influence by the political branches, and they also
protect individual litigants’ interest in fair decision making.58 Litigants can waive the latter protection,59 but the former protection is
structural and not subject to waiver.60 In this subpart, I first frame the
question by situating it within modern doctrines concerning non-Article-III decision makers, and I argue that applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine to state-law tort suits brought in federal court complies
with Article III only if we can view the FDA as an “adjunct” to the
Article III federal courts. I then briefly review the Court’s primary
jurisdiction precedents, concluding that they provide no reason to depart from my initial assessment.
The Court has stressed that suits between private parties involving
state common-law claims fall within the “core” of what the Court terms
“private rights” suits.61 This appears to mean that non-Article-III federal tribunals can adjudicate such claims only if those tribunals function as “adjuncts” to an Article III court.62 True, in Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co., the Court allowed Congress to relegate what might seem like a “private rights” claim to a non-Article-III
decision maker, with minimal Article III court review, partly on the
ground that the claim was “closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme.”63 And some might be tempted to argue that tort claims regarding FDA-approved products are, likewise, closely integrated into
the FDA’s regulatory scheme. However, such a comparison is tenuous
because Thomas involved congressionally mandated arbitration of disputes between pesticide registrants concerning compensation (by a
57
58
59
60
61

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
Id. at 848–49.
Id. at 850–51.
See, e.g., id. at 853; Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584

(1985).
62
63

See infra notes 70–84 and accompanying text.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593–94.
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follow-on registrant) for use of a prior registrant’s health and safety
data.64 Moreover, the claims in Thomas did “not depend on or replace
a right to . . . compensation under state law,”65 so Thomas is of limited
relevance to the sort of state-law tort claims at issue here.
Likewise, the Court’s decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor has limited relevance here. Schor, in upholding the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)’s authority to hear
brokers’ state-law counterclaims in reparation proceedings brought by
customers, relied in part on the notion that the customer in question
had consented to have the claims heard by the non-Article-III decision
maker.66 (The Court also noted that the CFTC was a relatively independent body67—a claim that is harder to make about the FDA.68)
Litigant consent is likely absent in the scenario considered in this Article because plaintiffs are likely to prefer a jury determination to a
binding determination by the FDA on issues such as product safety
and causation.69
Accordingly, if the use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by federal courts in tort cases involving FDA-approved products complies
with Article III, it will be because it adheres to the “adjunct” model
approved in Crowell v. Benson.70 Crowell involved a workers’ compensation scheme designed to replace traditional negligence claims that
would have been brought in admiralty.71 Under the workers’ compensation scheme, officials of the United States Employees’ Compen64

See id. at 571–75.
Id. at 584.
66
See Schor, 478 U.S. at 849.
67
See id. at 855.
68
See John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food and Drug Prosecutions, CHAMPION, July 1997, at 20, 20 (explaining that, although the FDA Commissioner
must be confirmed by the Senate, the Commissioner “serves at the pleasure of the [Health
and Human Services] Secretary and, therefore, the President”).
69
One can imagine a scenario in which a court could infer a plaintiff’s consent—for
example, if federal courts are known to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine but the
state courts do not, and if the plaintiff nonetheless chooses to sue in federal court. Such a
scenario, however, is unlikely.
One reason why plaintiffs and their lawyers would likely prefer jury determinations to
binding FDA determinations is that the plaintiff’s bar may question the FDA’s willingness
to admit that an FDA-approved product is, in fact, unreasonably dangerous. See James T.
O’Reilly, Drug Review “Behind the Curtain”: A Response to Professor Struve, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1078 (2008) (“The likelihood that a highly politicized FDA management would support plaintiffs in product liability actions by plaintiffs during a conservative administration
is minimal. And even under a more liberal administration, bureaucratic self-esteem is so
great that the FDA would still probably decline to support plaintiffs, because supporting
plaintiffs would be supporting claims contrary to the prior approval of bureaucratic
peers.”).
70
285 U.S. 22, 50–52 (1932); see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 78 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“The use of administrative agencies as adjuncts
was first upheld in Crowell v. Benson.”) (citation omitted).
71
See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 38–41.
65
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sation Commission would determine damages claims, and federal
courts would enforce the Commission’s compensation orders.72 In so
doing, the federal court would review legal issues de novo, but would
defer to the Commission’s findings of fact.73 (The Court, however,
interpreted the statutory scheme as not requiring federal courts to
defer to the Commission’s findings of fact relevant to the Commission’s jurisdiction74 or to constitutional rights.75)
The Court clearly did not think the Crowell case fell within the
“public rights” doctrine—a doctrine that, if it had applied, would have
allowed a non-Article-III decision maker to determine the claims.76
But, despite viewing the dispute in Crowell as a “private rights” case,77
the Court upheld the scheme’s directive that the courts defer to the
Commission’s findings of fact, explaining that “there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial
power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be
made by judges.”78
A federal court’s referral to the FDA of product safety or causation issues arising in a tort suit could thus comport with Crowell’s view
of Article III requirements. Such referrals would occur only in cases
involving FDA-regulated drugs,79 and they would “furnish a prompt,
continuous, expert, and inexpensive method for dealing with a class
of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and
72

See id. at 42–44.
Id. at 45–46.
74
Id. at 63.
75
Id. at 60.
76
See id. at 50–51. The Court in Crowell explained that “public rights” matters are
cases that “arise between the government and person subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” Id. at 50. “Private rights” matters, on the other hand, concern “the liability of one
individual to another.” Id. at 51. It is well established that “public rights” disputes can be
assigned to a non-Article-III decision maker. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69–70 (1982) (plurality opinion).
77
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51 (“The present case . . . is one of private right . . . .”).
78
Id. It was, however, key that the courts could provide independent review, under
the statutory scheme, with respect to jurisdictional and constitutional facts. See id. at 62.
79
If a federal statutory scheme vests a non-Article-III decision maker with authority
over only a narrow subject matter, the restriction may help to establish, under Crowell, that
the non-Article-III decision maker is serving merely as an adjunct to the Article III courts.
For example, in Crowell, the Court noted that the statute in question had “a limited application, being confined to the relation of master and servant.” Id. at 54. This was one of the
points on which the Northern Pipeline plurality relied in distinguishing Crowell and concluding that bankruptcy judges (under the system created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978)
could not be viewed as mere “adjuncts” to the Article III district judges:
[T]he agency in Crowell made only specialized, narrowly confined factual
determinations regarding a particularized area of law. In contrast, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts encompasses not only
traditional matters of bankruptcy, but also “all civil proceedings arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”
N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (repealed 1984)).
73
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determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that
task.”80
Admittedly, one might distinguish the present context from that
in Crowell by observing that the claim at issue in Crowell was a creature
of federal statute, whereas the claim at issue in a tort suit involving an
FDA-approved product would be a creature of state law.81 The Court
has acknowledged that separation-of-powers concerns are stronger
when Congress seeks to assign to a non-Article-III tribunal the adjudication of a claim that Congress has not created.82 Thus, the Court will
very closely scrutinize any congressional attempt to assign to a nonArticle-III “adjunct” the determination of a private rights claim arising
under state law.83 However, even though the workers’ compensation
scheme in Crowell was a creature of federal statute, it resembled a
state-law tort claim more closely than it may seem because it supplanted an older field of judge-made doctrine recognizing claims in
admiralty.84
The speculative tone of this discussion arises from the fact that
none of the Court’s primary jurisdiction decisions address these questions in any depth. And few of those decisions involve the configuration implicated here (i.e., a state-law claim between private parties in
federal court). One rare—and early—example of the configuration
implicated here is General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., which involved a breach of contract action concerning a railroad car lease.85 After the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
held in 1934 that certain arrangements concerning mileage allowances constituted rebates, General American refused to continue
paying the full amount due under the lease on the ground that a portion of that amount would constitute an unlawful rebate.86 El Dorado
sued General American in federal district court in assumpsit, seeking
the sums due under the lease.87 After the district court and court of
appeals reached differing conclusions on the merits, General Ameri80

Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46.
A violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act does not give rise to a
private right of action under federal law. E.g., Ellis v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 311 F.3d 1272, 1284
n.10 (11th Cir. 2002).
82
See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83–84; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986) (“[T]he state law character of a claim is significant for
purposes of determining the effect that an initial adjudication of those claims by a nonArticle-III tribunal will have on the separation of powers for the simple reason that private,
common law rights were historically the types of matters subject to resolution by Article III
courts.”).
83
See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (plurality opinion).
84
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985) (discussing Crowell).
85
308 U.S. 422, 423–25 (1940).
86
Id. at 426.
87
Id. at 423.
81
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can (the loser in the court of appeals) sought Supreme Court review.88 The ICC filed an amicus brief arguing that the courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear the suit because it was within the Commission’s
purview.89 The Court rejected the ICC’s jurisdictional argument, noting that “[t]he action was an ordinary one in assumpsit on a written
contract”;90 but the Court nonetheless reversed, holding that “[w]hen
it appeared in the course of the litigation that an administrative problem, committed to the Commission, was involved, the court should
have stayed its hand pending the Commission’s determination of the
lawfulness and reasonableness of the practices under the terms of the
Act.”91
The General American Tank Car decision mentioned neither the
Seventh Amendment nor Article III. Although El Dorado’s brief did
not raise constitutional objections in response to the ICC’s arguments,92 Article III separation-of-powers concerns are not subject to
waiver.93 But at the time, the Court’s case law concerning non-ArticleIII decision makers was less developed than it is today. And to the
extent that private suits arising under state law pose particularly strong
Article III concerns under modern case law, those concerns might
have been somewhat more muted in 1940 because the very notion
that an assumpsit action arose under state law (as opposed to general
common law) was itself of recent vintage.94 In any event, the General
American Tank Car decision does provide a precedent for applying the
primary jurisdiction doctrine to a state-law claim between private parties in federal court.
Among modern cases, one can find another analogue to the present context in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corp.95 Coit presented “the question whether Congress
granted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), as receiver, the exclusive authority to adjudicate the state law
88

See id. at 427–28.
Id. at 428.
90
Id. at 432.
91
Id. at 433.
92
See Brief for Respondent in Answer to Brief of Interstate Commerce Commission as
Amicus Curiae, Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940)
(No. 129), 1939 WL 48376.
93
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
94
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general
common law.”).
95
489 U.S. 561 (1989). As noted above, the configuration that interests us is one in
which state-law claims between private parties are litigated in federal court. In Coit, the
plaintiff sued in state court, seeking damages on a state-law usury claim. Id. at 565. FSLIC,
newly appointed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board as receiver for the defendant
savings and loan, substituted itself as defendant, removed the case to federal court, and
secured a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court of appeals affirmed. See
id. at 565–67.
89

R
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claims asserted against a failed savings and loan association.”96 The
Court interpreted the statutory scheme so as not to grant such authority; instead, the Court held, “the creditors of a failed savings and loan
association are entitled to de novo consideration of their claims in
court.”97 The Court noted that its interpretation of the statutory
scheme avoided what otherwise would be grave constitutional
questions:
[W]e need not reach Coit’s claim that adjudication by FSLIC subject only to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
would violate Article III of the Constitution under Northern Pipeline . . . . Similarly, we need not reach Coit’s due process and Seventh Amendment challenges to adjudication by FSLIC of its state
law claims. We note, however, that the usury and breach of fiduciary duty claims raised by Coit . . . involve “private rights” which are
at the “core” of “matters normally reserved to Article III courts.”
The court below adopted an interpretation of the statutes governing FSLIC and the [Federal Home Loan] Bank Board that raises
serious constitutional difficulties. In our view, those statutes can
and should be read to avoid these difficulties.98

Thus, although General American Tank Car provides precedent for
applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine to state-law claims between
private parties litigated in federal court, Coit suggests that courts
should carefully cabin such an application in order to avoid constitutional problems. One important factor is the nature and extent of the
review (in the federal court action) of the FDA’s findings on the referred questions; the more searching the review, the more likely the
referral will fit within the “adjunct” model. In Crowell, the commissioner’s factual findings (other than those relating to jurisdictional or
constitutional questions) were final unless they were “arbitrary” or
“contrary to the indisputable character of the evidence.”99 A primary
jurisdiction mechanism that permits more searching review of the
FDA’s findings—for example, by permitting either party to present
rebuttal evidence and providing that the FDA’s findings were, at most,
prima facie evidence—would be more likely to constitute a permissible example of the “adjunct” model under Crowell.
96

Id. at 564.
Id.
98
Id. at 578–79 (citations omitted) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986)).
99
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49–50 (1932) (“There is thus no attempt to interfere with . . . the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction to deny effect to any administrative
finding which is without evidence, or ‘contrary to the indisputable character of the evidence,’ or where the hearing is ‘inadequate,’ or ‘unfair,’ or arbitrary in any respect.”)
(quoting Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
91–92 (1913)).
97
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B. Seventh Amendment Constraints
1. Primary Jurisdiction Decisions and the Seventh Amendment
As I detailed in a prior article, the Court’s primary jurisdiction
decisions shed little more light on the Seventh Amendment question
than they do on the Article III question.100 Most of these decisions
arose in cases where the litigants either lacked101 or failed to properly
raise102 a Seventh Amendment right. Two cases—Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwest Railway Co.103 and Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference104—did implicate the Seventh Amendment but, as I will explain,
they do not settle the question at hand.
In Keogh, the plaintiff claimed the right to have a jury decide his
claims for antitrust damages.105 But by the time of trial, the ICC had
approved the rates that the plaintiff sought to challenge, and the
lower court accordingly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.106 Seen in
this context, the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the dismissal107 can
be viewed as merely presaging the Court’s later holding that issue preclusion can apply (in a case where there would be a Seventh Amendment jury right) even if the preclusive judgment arose from a nonjury
proceeding.108
100

See Struve, supra note 5, at 640–42.
There is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury if the suit is litigated in state court
or if the suit seeks solely injunctive relief. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 719 (1999). Some of the Court’s primary jurisdiction decisions involved suits litigated in state court. See, e.g., S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 426
(1907). Other decisions involved suits in which the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. See,
e.g., Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573 (1952) (involving a suit by the
United States to enjoin alleged antitrust violations); U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
284 U.S. 474, 478 (1932) (involving a suit to enjoin alleged antitrust violation); Bd. of R.R.
Comm’rs v. Great N. Ry. Co., 281 U.S. 412, 416 (1930) (involving a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state agency’s rate-setting order).
102
See, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324–25 (1972)
(refusing to answer the Seventh Amendment question because the Court “do[es] not
reach for constitutional questions not raised by the parties”); Brief for the Petitioner, Ricci
v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973) (No. 71-858) (failing to assert right to jury
trial as basis for reversal); Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S.
289 (1973) (No. 71-858) (same); Brief for Respondent, Port of Boston Marine Terminal
Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62 (1970) (No. 99) (making no mention of right to jury trial); Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 73-241) (same).
103
260 U.S. 156 (1922).
104
383 U.S. 213 (1966).
105
See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error at 13, 15, Keogh, 260 U.S. 156 (No.
823).
106
See Transcript of Record from the District Court of the United States for Northern
District of Illinois at 41–42, Keogh (No. 823).
107
See Keogh, 260 U.S. at 165.
108
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
101
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Carnation involved a claim for antitrust damages arising from rate
agreements implemented by shipping company associations.109 The
parties’ Supreme Court briefs focused on whether the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)’s statutory authority over rate agreements
barred the plaintiff from bringing an antitrust claim against the associations. The plaintiff asserted, in its petition for certiorari, that
precluding the antitrust remedy would “improperly . . . deprive [it] of
a right of trial by jury.”110 The FMC, for its part, argued for a stay of
the antitrust action in order to give the FMC an opportunity to decide
whether the rate agreements violated the Shipping Act.111 But before
the briefing in the Supreme Court was concluded, the FMC reached
its determination on that issue, ruling that the rate agreements challenged by the plaintiff did indeed violate the Shipping Act.112 Because this finding favored the plaintiff, it is understandable that the
plaintiff’s reply brief did not argue that the application of those FMC
findings in its antitrust suit would violate the Seventh Amendment.113
And because Seventh Amendment rights are waivable, the plaintiff’s
failure to press a Seventh Amendment argument in its reply brief explains the Supreme Court’s failure to mention the Seventh Amendment when, ultimately, the Court remanded the antitrust suit with
instructions to stay it “pending the final outcome of the Shipping Act
proceedings” (because the FMC’s decision had been appealed).114
The Court’s primary jurisdiction cases, thus, do not settle the
question at hand. The few commentators to discuss the question have
noted doubt as to whether an agency determination on a referred issue can be binding in a case where a Seventh Amendment jury right
applies.115 We must therefore turn to more general Seventh Amendment principles in order to analyze the question.
2. Reasoning from General Principles of the Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment, when it applies to a claim, protects a
litigant’s right to have a jury rather than a judge determine material
109

See Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 215 (1966).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Carnation, 383 U.S. 213 (No. 20) (listing questions presented).
111
See Memorandum for the Federal Maritime Commission at 5–6, Carnation, 383 U.S.
213 (No. 20); see also Brief for the United States and the Federal Maritime Commission at
13, Carnation, 383 U.S. 213 (No. 20).
112
See Carnation, 383 U.S. at 223 n.6.
113
See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Carnation, 383 U.S. 213 (No. 20) (making no mention
of the Seventh Amendment).
114
Carnation, 383 U.S. at 223–24.
115
See, e.g., 5 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 47.03[2] (2007); Robert B.
von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,
67 HARV. L. REV. 929, 963 (1954).
110
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disputes of fact.116 (It is unnecessary, for purposes of this Article, to
explore the boundaries of the Amendment’s application, because tort
claims for damages fall squarely within its ambit.) By requiring courts
to submit some types of issues to a jury, the Amendment brings the
general public’s values into the adjudication process and ensures popular participation in governance.117 Although the Amendment does
“not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law” as of the Amendment’s adoption in 1791,118 it does constrain a court’s ability to refer
to non-jury decision makers those issues to which a right to trial by
jury attaches.119
To explore this constraint, it is instructive to examine the line of
cases concerning court-appointed auditors and special masters.120 In
re Peterson, a 1920 decision concerning the use of an auditor in an
action at law,121 provides one of the Court’s most extended discussions of the constraints imposed by the Seventh Amendment. Faced
with a dispute over payments for a series of coal purchases, the trial
judge appointed an auditor to take testimony, examine the relevant
accounts, and make a report that would “simplify[ ] the issues for the
jury, but not . . . finally determine any of the issues in the action.”122
The Court, rejecting the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment challenge to
the appointment, held that the auditor could permissibly “define and
simplify the issues” for the jury, and that the submission of the auditor’s findings to the jury, as prima facie evidence, would not “unduly
interfer[e] with the jury’s determination of issues of fact.”123 Noting
that the parties were free to submit evidence to controvert the auditor’s findings, the Court found no constitutional bar to “endow[ing]
116

See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 599–600 (1993) (discussing the events leading to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment and noting that “[i]t was critical to the Antifederalists that
the jury serve the interests of democracy by injecting the values of the ‘many’ into judicial
proceedings”).
118
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336–37 (1979) (quoting Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943)).
119
The Seventh Amendment requires courts to undertake an issue-by-issue analysis of
the jury right. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 & n.10 (1970). For the purposes of this Article, I assume that,
in a tort suit for damages, questions of product safety and causation would be for the jury.
120
See David Elbaum, Note, Judicial Review of Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under
CERCLA: Implications of the Right to Trial by Jury, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 352, 392 (1995) (suggesting that, when assessing possible Seventh Amendment constraints on federal-court deference to administrative agency fact-finding, “useful analogies may be drawn to other areas
of law where courts have permitted pretrial factual determinations by judicial adjuncts to
be used in jury trials”—such as “the use of special masters’ reports”).
121
253 U.S. 300, 304 (1920).
122
Id. (quoting Peterson v. Davison, 254 F. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)).
123
Id. at 310–11.
117
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an official act or finding with a presumption of regularity or of
verity.”124
Of particular note in the current context, the Peterson Court relied125 on its then-recent decision in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad.126
Meeker upheld a statute providing that the ICC’s findings would be
prima facie evidence in reparation suits concerning violations of the
Interstate Commerce Act.127 In upholding the trial court’s award of
damages to the plaintiff shipper, the Court rejected the defendant
railroad’s contention that treating the ICC’s report as prima facie evidence violated the Seventh Amendment:
The provision only establishes a rebuttable presumption. It cuts off
no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the
issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury. At
most, therefore, it is merely a rule of evidence. It does not abridge
the right of trial by jury, or take away any of its incidents.128

The referral to an auditor approved by the Court in Peterson may
not perfectly equate to a similar use of an agency for initial fact-finding purposes. The Peterson Court observed that the case for constitutionality was “in one respect, stronger” in Peterson than in Meeker
because the auditor in Peterson was court-appointed and court-supervised, and his report could “be used only if, and so far as, acceptable
to the court.”129 An agency fact-finding process, by contrast, would
not be court-supervised, and opponents might argue that this distinction weakens the case for constitutionality. But reliance on this distinction seems unpersuasive. Although the degree of court control
over the fact-finding process might well affect the Article III analysis, it
is less clear whether this factor should strongly affect the Seventh
Amendment analysis.
At any rate, one concept emerges plainly from the Peterson
Court’s discussion: there is a vital distinction between using thirdparty factual findings as evidence (even as prima facie evidence) and
using third-party factual findings to bind the jury. The Court explained that “[a] compulsory reference with power to determine issues is impossible in the federal courts because of the Seventh
124

Id. at 311.
See id. at 311 (citing Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915)).
126
236 U.S. 412 (1915).
127
Id. at 430. The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended in 1906, provided that if a
carrier failed to pay damages awarded by the ICC for a violation of the Act, the complainant could sue in federal court and the suit would “proceed in all respects like other civil
suits for damages, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated . . . .” Interstate Commerce
Act § 16, 34 Stat. 590 (1906) (repealed 1978).
128
Meeker, 236 U.S. at 430.
129
In re Peterson, 253 U.S. at 311–12.
125
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Amendment but no reason exists why a compulsory reference to an
auditor to simplify and clarify the issues and to make tentative findings may not be made . . . when occasion arises.”130 As the Court
stated earlier in the opinion, “The limitation imposed by the amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the
jury be not interfered with.”131
Peterson, which predated the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, influenced the subsequent use of court-appointed
masters under Rule 53. Prior to 2003, Rule 53 permitted courts to
appoint a master in jury cases involving complex issues,132 and provided that the master’s findings constituted admissible evidence that
could be read to the jury.133 The goal was to help the jury navigate an
issue’s complexity, not to constrain the jury’s ultimate decision.134 In
1962, the Supreme Court noted that the then-applicable version of
Rule 53(b) authorized courts to appoint masters “to assist the jury in
those exceptional cases where the legal issues are too complicated for
the jury adequately to handle alone,” but stressed that the need for
such appointments should be rare.135 A number of court of appeals
decisions, citing Peterson, stated that a court’s use of the Rule 53 procedure did not violate the Seventh Amendment.136
Under the principles that emerge from the line of cases dealing
with court-appointed auditors and special masters, we can see that the
Seventh Amendment would permit the use of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine in federal court only if the issues determined by the FDA can
be reexamined by the jury once the parties return to court. If a federal court applies the primary jurisdiction doctrine to refer factual issues (such as product safety or injury causation) to the FDA, the FDA’s
findings could permissibly be submitted to the jury as prima facie evi130

Id. at 314 (citation omitted).
Id. at 310.
132
The pre-2003 version of Rule 53 provided that “[a] reference to a master shall be
the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made
only when the issues are complicated . . . .” Civil Rules Amendments Transmitted to Congress, March 2003, at 109, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/congress0303/CVRedline.pdf. The current version of Rule 53 bars the court from using a special master to
recommend findings of fact in a jury case unless the parties consent. See FED. R. CIV. P.
53(a)(1).
133
The pre-2003 version of Rule 53 provided that “[t]he master’s findings upon the
issues submitted to the master are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be
read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections in point of law
which may be made to the report.” Civil Rules Amendments Transmitted to Congress,
supra note 132, at 115.
134
See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 459 (1958).
135
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 & n.18 (1962).
136
See, e.g., Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc., 536 F.2d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 1976).
131
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dence. But, in actions to which it applies, the Seventh Amendment
requires that the parties be free to put in evidence to controvert the
FDA findings, and that the jury be free to reach a different conclusion
than the FDA if warranted by the evidence. It would not be permissible to require the jury to defer to the FDA’s findings.137
III
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS IN STATE-COURT LITIGATION
Thus far, I have discussed the constitutional constraints on the
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in federal-court litigation. But much of the litigation (involving FDA-approved products)
that implicates the primary jurisdiction doctrine will take place in
state, rather than federal, courts.138 In state courts, the constitutional
questions are even murkier than in federal court. This Part explores
those questions and concludes that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
is most likely to avoid constitutional problems if Congress creates a
substantive federal-law defense, provides for referral to the FDA of issues relating to that defense, and provides that FDA determinations
are, at most, prima facie evidence.139 After reviewing cases in which
the Court applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine in state-court litigation, I turn to the Court’s modern federalism decisions and consider factors that would affect a constitutional analysis of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine’s application to state-court litigation.
The Seventh Amendment, of course, does not apply to state-court
litigation.140 However, forty-eight states have constitutional provisions
137
David Elbaum made this point with respect to natural resource damage claims
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA). See Elbaum, supra note 120, at 391.
138
For example, the proposed Vioxx settlement agreement, announced in November
2007 by Merck and certain plaintiffs’ counsel, states that “[m]ore than 95% of the active
plaintiffs are presently coordinated in one of . . . four ‘Coordinated Proceedings.’” Settlement Agreement at 1 (2007), http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement_
Agreement.pdf. Among those four proceedings, three were coordinated in state court. See
id. at 1–2.
139
I focus this Part on a hypothetical federal statute authorizing the use of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine because it presents the strongest case for the doctrine’s valid application in state courts. Admittedly, courts have applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine in a
number of contexts without any explicit statutory directive. See, e.g., TCG New York, Inc. v.
City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2002) (characterizing the primary jurisdiction
doctrine as “judge-made”). But, because applying the doctrine to state-court litigation
would alter the balance of power between the states and the federal government, the Court
should be wary of imposing the doctrine in state courts without clear direction from Congress. Direction from Congress would at least provide some assurance that the federalism
implications had been weighed by a democratically accountable branch in which the interests of the states might be represented to some degree.
140
See, e.g., Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881, 900 n.17 (2007).

R
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guaranteeing the right to a jury in civil cases,141 and the two states that
lack such provisions have provided a right to a jury by statute.142 Although a survey of state law on the right to a jury is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is likely that, in many instances, state constitutional
law protects a litigant’s right to have issues of product safety and causation submitted to the jury in a products liability suit (assuming the
litigant has submitted sufficient evidence to survive judgment as a matter of law).
The states’ basic laws, therefore, entrust to juries issues that the
primary jurisdiction doctrine would instead place before the FDA.
This raises federalism concerns because the Court has recognized that
state control over state-court structure and procedure is central to
state sovereignty. Even when a state court adjudicates a federal claim,
“[t]he general rule, ‘bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of
state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the
state courts as it finds them.’”143 Therefore, the states “have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.”144
And, considering that federalism concerns are heightened when the
federal government requires a state court to alter its decision-making
structure145—as the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
would require—one might question the constitutionality of applying
the primary jurisdiction doctrine to state-court litigation. But a handful of early- to mid-twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions have
sanctioned the doctrine’s application, without giving any indication
141
See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19; DEL. CONST., art.
I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XI; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 13;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 9; KAN. CONST., B. OF RIGHTS, § 5; KY. CONST. § 7; ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 5; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31; MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26;
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XX; N.J. CONST. art. I,
pt. 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. I, § 17; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. I,
art. 12; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9.
142
Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a) provides that factual issues shall be tried to
a jury “in actions wherein a trial by jury is provided by constitution or by statute, including
actions . . . for injuries to person or property.” COLO. R. CIV. P. 38(a). The Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure provides a right to trial by jury in tort suits, but provides an exception for suits “where the amount of no individual petitioner’s cause of action exceeds fifty
thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731,
1732(1) (2003).
143
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
144
Id.
145
See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 (1997).
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that it was constitutionally problematic. Part III.A considers the impact of those decisions.
A. Primary Jurisdiction Cases Involving State Courts
Two statutory schemes—the Interstate Commerce Act and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—have given rise to Supreme
Court decisions applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine to statecourt litigation.
In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., a shipper
sued a carrier in a state-court action at law, seeking damages and alleging that the carrier’s rates were unreasonable and discriminatory.146
The Supreme Court held that the state court lacked power to entertain the suit unless and until the ICC declared that the rates were
unreasonable.147 According to the Court, application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine was necessary to achieve Congress’s goal of uniform rates:
For if, without previous action by the Commission, power might be
exerted by courts and juries generally to determine the reasonableness of an established rate, it would follow that, unless all courts
reached an identical conclusion, a uniform standard of rates in the
future would be impossible, as the standard would fluctuate and
vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached as to reasonableness by the various courts called upon to consider the subject as an original question. Indeed, the recognition of such a right
is wholly inconsistent with the administrative power conferred upon
the [ICC], and with the duty, which the statute casts upon that
body, of seeing to it that the statutory requirement as to uniformity
and equality of rates is observed.148

The Abilene litigation appears not to have involved a jury,149 but
the Abilene Court’s reference to juries in the above passage indicates
that the Court contemplated that its primary-jurisdiction ruling would
apply with equal force in cases tried to a jury. Indeed, when the Court
subsequently held in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator
Co. that a state court need not await an ICC ruling before hearing a
case involving the construction of a tariff (as contrasted with a case involving the reasonableness of a tariff), the Court’s rationale was that
tariff interpretation presented an issue of law that the Supreme Court
could review, thus providing national uniformity.150 Issues of fact that
would ordinarily go to a jury, by contrast, were not subject to de novo
146
147
148
149
150

204 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1907).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 440–41.
See id. at 431–32 (recounting trial court’s findings of fact).
259 U.S. 285, 290–91 (1922).
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Supreme Court review—hence the need for the primary jurisdiction
doctrine to provide national uniformity.151
Although the Court’s decision a few decades later in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon did not discuss the role of juries, the
Court similarly stressed uniformity as a reason for applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine.152 In Garmon, the Court held that activities
protected under section 7 and activities designated as unfair labor
practices under section 8 of the NLRA were within the core of matters
to which Congress directed the NLRA and, thus, were outside state
regulatory power.153 It was unclear whether the union activities at issue in Garmon constituted unfair labor practices; if not, then the
NLRA would not oust state jurisdiction.154 But the Court held that
the primary jurisdiction doctrine applied anyway and that the state
court could not proceed unless and until the Nation Labor Relations
Board reached a determination that the activities fell outside the purview of the NLRA.155 The Court supported its application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by asserting that if the doctrine applied to
federal courts, it must also apply to state courts: “What is outside the
scope of this Court’s authority cannot remain within a State’s power
and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board.”156
Abilene and Garmon apply a somewhat different model of the primary jurisdiction doctrine than the one on which this Article focuses.
Rather than require referral to a federal agency during the course of
an ongoing state lawsuit, those cases prohibit the state lawsuit from
even commencing until the parties have obtained the necessary
agency determination. But by approving that model of primary jurisdiction, the cases suggest that the doctrine, in general, can constitutionally apply to state-court litigation, even litigation in which there is
a state-law jury trial right. Nonetheless, before we conclude that these
cases—now roughly half a century old or more—prove the permissibility of such an application, we should consider whether such federal
regulation of state-court procedure would conform to the Court’s
more modern federalism decisions.
B. The Court’s Modern Federalism Decisions
As we have seen, the Court recognizes that control of state-court
structure and procedure are basic aspects of state sovereignty.157
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

See
See
Id.
See
See
Id.
See

id. at 291.
359 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1959).
at 244.
id. at 244–45.
id. at 246.
at 245.
supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.

R
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Therefore, when a state court hears a federal claim—as indeed state
courts must, absent a valid excuse158—the state court is largely free to
use its own procedure. On occasion, the Court has required state
courts hearing federal claims to adopt certain aspects of federal procedure. For example, the right to a jury trial is so integral to the remedy
provided by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that the right applies
in state as well as federal court.159 Federal procedure has likewise displaced state procedure concerning notice-of-claim requirements,160
pleading,161 burdens of proof,162 and awards of prejudgment interest.163 But though it is clear that the federal government can require
state courts to adopt some federal procedures when hearing a federallaw claim, it is much less clear whether the federal government can
require state courts to adopt federal procedures when hearing a statelaw claim.
Congress might implement a primary-jurisdiction mechanism in
state court in a variety of ways, and the details of the implementation
would affect the constitutional analysis.164 I will first consider the
strongest case for such a mechanism’s validity: a hypothetical federal
statute, which creates a federal-law defense to state products liability
suits and requires referral of that defense to the FDA for a non-binding advisory determination. I will then alter the variables so as to consider two different, more questionable examples of the hypothetical
legislation.
1. The Strongest Case for Constitutionality
In the strongest-case example, the hypothetical legislation (creating a federal-law defense and requiring referral of that defense to the
FDA for a non-binding determination) would be a valid use of Con158

See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1947).
See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952).
160
See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988).
161
See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 295–96 (1949).
162
See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942).
163
See Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335–36 (1988).
164
In fact, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 might be read to impose a
mechanism akin to the primary jurisdiction doctrine for a narrow subset of products liability cases involving medical implants. See 21 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000). The Act provides federal
liability standards for claims against suppliers of medical implant components, including
making such suppliers subject to liability if they should have registered with the FDA as the
device’s manufacturer but failed to do so. See id. § 1604(b)(2). The Act further provides a
mechanism for the court to stay a tort action pending a determination on this issue by the
FDA. See id. § 1604(b)(3)(D). The Act, however, is ambiguous on the question of whether
the FDA determination is a prerequisite for this avenue of liability. See id. §§ 1604–1605. If
the FDA determination is a prerequisite, then the Act imposes something similar to the
primary jurisdiction doctrine. But because the Act applies only to a narrow subset of potential cases, is ambiguous, and has not yet been construed in any published court opinions, this Article does not explore it further.
159
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gress’s commerce power,165 and it would likely not violate the federalism values embodied in the Tenth Amendment.166 Clearly, drug
safety has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,167 and drugs
have long been subject to comprehensive federal regulation.168 Congress could exercise its commerce power to enact a statute providing
defendants in drug products liability cases with a defense to liability
if—under specified federal standards—the drug was safe or it did not
cause the plaintiff’s injury. Congress’s ability to control state-court
procedure might not be as great in this instance as in the case of a
claim created by federal law, but the fact that a federal law defense is at
issue should bolster Congress’s authority to alter state procedure.169
Arguably, Congress can require state courts to use certain procedures
that it deems integral to the federal statutory scheme to ensure that
the state courts properly apply the federal defense (as the Supremacy
Clause170 requires).171
165
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
166
See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”). The Court has suggested that the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment questions are simply mirror images of each other. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 159 (1992). More recently, however, the Court has first asked the question of
whether Congress has regulatory power under the Commerce Clause and then asked about
the limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148–51
(2000); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 964 & n.92 (2001) (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 155–56 and Condon, 528 U.S. at 149).
167
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“Congress has the power to regulate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”).
168
See generally Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420 (1981) (giving a historical account of drug regulation
from 1848 to 1976).
169
See Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 23 (1999) (“Congress can create a federal defense and by extension, when the necessity arises due to federal interest, Congress should have the authority
to regulate the manner in which state courts hear and decide that defense.”).
As discussed in the introductory portion of Part III.B., the classic cases concerning
federal authority over state-court procedure arise in the context of federally created claims.
But the rationale the Court applied in those cases (roughly speaking, to ensure the appropriate vindication of the federal right) should also apply to federally created defenses. To
the extent that burdens of proof might be considered procedural, one example might be
the requirement that a public figure prove “actual malice” in a defamation case by clear
and convincing evidence. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80,
285–86 (1964). In such a case, the federal burden-of-proof requirement arises because of
the federal-law (First Amendment) defense. See id.
170
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
171
A congressional finding that the procedural requirements are integral to the statutory scheme would serve to rebut the argument that court procedures are not themselves
activities that are subject to regulation under the commerce power. As the Court explained in Hodel v. Indiana:
A complex regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that
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In the strongest-case example, the federally-required procedure
would be the non-binding referral of the safety and causation issues
(relevant to the federal-law defense) to the FDA for a non-binding
determination. This would disrupt state-court procedures in three
ways: (1) it would delay the suit for the length of time necessary to
obtain a finding from the FDA; (2) it would require the admission of
the FDA’s findings as prima facie evidence on drug safety and causation; and (3) it would require the dismissal of the claim as a matter of
law if the plaintiff failed to present evidence to rebut an FDA finding
in the defense’s favor on safety or causation. But, assuming that the
plaintiff presented rebuttal evidence, this procedure would not remove the jury’s authority over the ultimate liability determination.
And, although a survey of state law on jury rights is beyond the scope
of this Article, it seems safe to say that the non-binding nature of the
FDA determination would reduce the likelihood that the procedure
would offend state jury trial rights.
2. A Weaker Case: No Issues of Substantive Federal Law
This weaker case contains the same procedural provisions as the
strongest case, but it does not create a substantive federal-law defense.
This version of the hypothetical statute, in other words, would create
no substantive rules for products-liability lawsuits, but it would require
state courts hearing such suits to refer certain issues of product safety
and causation to the FDA for an advisory determination. Can Congress regulate state-court procedure in cases where the claims and defenses involve no issues of substantive federal law? As commentators
have noted,172 it has already done so through a number of statutes.
Some of those statutes have already been upheld by the Court.
For example, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires state (as well
as federal) courts to enforce written arbitration clauses concerning
disputes over contracts involving interstate commerce,173 even if they
otherwise would have proceeded to hear the claims. Although one
the challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program
and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this
test.
452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981).
172
See, e.g., Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
591, 620–27 (1999) (discussing the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 and the Y2K
Act); Bellia, supra note 166, at 954, 967–68 (discussing the Y2K Act and the Federal Arbitration Act); Parmet, supra note 169, at 7–8 (discussing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act); A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 437 (2000) (discussing the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998).
173
The FAA covers, inter alia, disputes arising from “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

R
R
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might distinguish the FAA on the grounds that the parties consented
in advance to arbitration, presumably the parties could not, by their
consent, cure a Tenth Amendment problem with the statute.174 Thus,
when the Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating interpreted the FAA to
“withdr[a]w the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration,”175 it can be taken to have indicated that it perceived no
Tenth Amendment problem with its interpretation.176 For another
example, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, includes a tolling provision relating to limitations periods for certain
state-law claims dismissed from a federal lawsuit and later asserted in
state court177—a provision the Court upheld in Jinks v. Richland
County as an exercise of Congress’s power “to establish the lower federal courts and provide for the fair and efficient exercise of their Article III powers.”178 And in Pierce County v. Guillen,179 the Court held
that a federal statute, which created an evidentiary privilege for a variety of documents that local governments collected to comply with federal highway safety grant provisions,180 constituted a valid exercise of
the commerce power.181 The Court declined, however, to address a
Tenth Amendment challenge because the court below had not resolved the issue.182
Commentators have questioned the validity of these statutes, expressing doubt over whether Congress has the authority to regulate
state-court procedure in state-law cases that present no issues of substantive federal law. For example, Professor Bellia has argued that
“[u]nder traditional conflicts principles . . . Congress has no authority
to prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow in state law
174
The Tenth Amendment serves structural goals concerning the allocation of power
between the state and federal governments. See, e.g, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch,
a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”). Thus, Tenth Amendment concerns presumably could not be wholly cured by an individual litigant consenting to a particular exercise
of federal legislative power. (Analogously, as noted above, although an individual litigant
may waive any individual-rights-based objections to the use of a non-Article-III federal decision maker, such a waiver would not cure structural Article III objections. See supra text
accompanying notes 59–60.)
175
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
176
One might argue, though, that the FAA poses less of a threat to federalism values
than the hypothetical statute because the FAA requires submission of disputes to an arbitrator, not to a federal agency—and thus raises less concern about federal aggrandizement.
177
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000).
178
538 U.S. 456, 464 (2003).
179
537 U.S. 129 (2003).
180
23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
181
See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147.
182
See id. at 148 n.10.
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cases.”183 The Jinks Court, noting Bellia’s argument, avoided the question by characterizing section 1367’s tolling provision as “substantive”
rather than “procedural”:
Assuming for the sake of argument that a principled dichotomy can
be drawn, for purposes of determining whether an Act of Congress
is “proper,” between federal laws that regulate state-court “procedure” and laws that change the “substance” of state-law rights of action, we do not think that state-law limitations periods fall into the
category of “procedure” immune from congressional regulation. . . .
[I]f the substance-procedure dichotomy posited by respondent is
valid the tolling of limitations periods falls on the “substantive” side
of the line. To sustain § 1367(d) in this case, we need not (and do
not) hold that Congress has unlimited power to regulate practice
and procedure in state courts.184

One can argue, as the Court did in Jinks, that a tolling provision is
not truly “procedural,” and that, likewise, an arbitration requirement
or an evidentiary privilege is not truly procedural. But they are all
arguably procedural—certainly they are routinely covered in civil procedure courses—and the Court’s approval of federal control over
state practices in these areas in Southland, Jinks, and Guillen suggests a
willingness to submit the states to some (but not an unlimited) degree
of federal procedural regulation, even in purely state-law cases.
Although some have argued that the commerce power does not
permit Congress to regulate state courts (which are not themselves
actors in interstate commerce),185 this argument would not necessarily sway the Court if it were confronted with our hypothetical statute.
In FERC v. Mississippi, the Court rejected a similar argument when it
upheld, against a Commerce Clause challenge, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)’s provisions directing state utility regulators and the utilities themselves to consider adopting certain
regulatory standards.186 As in FERC, where the Court focused on the
fact that the underlying regulated activity (electrical power generation) clearly affected interstate commerce,187 the underlying regulated activity here (drug manufacture and distribution) clearly affects
interstate commerce. It is true that the Court later stated in New York
v. United States that “[t]he allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause . . . authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce
183

Bellia, supra note 166, at 952.
Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 464–65 (2003).
185
See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233,
267 (2007) (“[R]egulating non-economic activity (state court adjudication), in an area of
traditional state regulation (punitive damages for state law claims), by regulating courts
rather than economic actors themselves—all based on the idea that such adjudications
substantially affect interstate commerce—is a few bridges too far.”).
186
See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 746, 757 (1982).
187
See id. at 757.
184
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directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’
regulation of interstate commerce,” but the Court nonetheless cited
FERC’s analysis with approval.188
In any event, if the Court were to apply its New York analysis, it
would suggest that the Commerce Clause and federalism analyses are
merely two ways of looking at the same problem. In that event, it cannot hurt to now turn to the Tenth Amendment analysis. That analysis,
as noted above, starts with the recognition that state control over
court procedure is central to state sovereignty.189 The Court should
therefore scrutinize the hypothetical statute to see whether it impermissibly alters the balance of state and federal authority.
In scrutinizing federal legislation that arguably intrudes upon
state prerogatives, the Court might ask—as it did in Printz v. United
States—whether the legislation blurs the constitutionally-mandated
lines of governmental accountability.190 Voters may be less likely to
hold federal officials accountable for procedural regulation than for
substantive regulation. As Professor Parmet suggests, such procedural
regulation may prevent the effective enforcement of state laws without
forcing Congress to “clearly accept[ ] the onus for that nonenforcement by more forthrightly preempting state laws.”191 In the context
of our hypothetical legislation, state courts could become, in the public’s mind, identified with outcomes that are more properly attributable to the decisions made by the FDA on referral.192 (Some states
already have provisions that might similarly blur lines of accountability, such as provisions that bar punitive damages resulting from products approved by the FDA;193 but, of course, in such instances an
organ of state government has chosen to adopt the relevant
provisions.)
A Tenth Amendment challenge to the sort of procedural regulation discussed here inevitably evokes the argument that the greater
power includes the lesser. Here, the argument would be that because
Congress could altogether preempt state tort claims concerning FDAapproved products, it can exercise the lesser power of controlling the
state courts’ procedures for adjudicating those claims. Invoking
Printz, Professor Bellia has challenged this contention:
188

505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
190
See 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
191
Parmet, supra note 169, at 50.
192
In striking down a statute that required state law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on gun purchasers, the Court noted that under that provision “it will
likely be the [state officer], not some federal official, who will be blamed for any error
(even one in the designated federal database) that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly
rejected.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.
193
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2001).
189
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Controlling the enforcement of state rights in state courts may well
be a greater power than controlling their enforcement in federal
courts because the latter would demand the use of federal resources. Indeed, under the Tenth Amendment, the “greater”
power to preempt state law does not include the “lesser” power to
commandeer state legislatures or executives.194

It is possible, however, that the most relevant precedent here is
not Printz but FERC. In upholding PURPA’s requirements that state
regulators consider adopting certain federally-prescribed regulatory
standards, follow certain procedures when considering those standards, and fulfill reporting duties, the FERC Court stressed that Congress could have chosen to supplant altogether state regulation of
electric utilities:
Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as private
rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA should not be invalid
simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the States to continue
regulating in the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal standards.195

In this respect, PURPA can be contrasted with the “take title” provision invalidated in New York v. United States.196 The latter provision
“offer[ed] state governments a ‘choice’ of either accepting ownership
of [low level radioactive] waste or regulating according to the instructions of Congress.”197 The problem was that neither option, by itself,
would have been constitutional:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the
power to offer the States a choice between the two. . . . A choice
between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no
choice at all.198

FERC accordingly seems to suggest that Congress’s power to preempt state tort liability for FDA-approved products could justify Congress’s choice not to preempt, but instead to regulate, the procedures
by which state courts adjudicate such claims. The latter sort of measure would, like PURPA, offer states a choice: continue to hear such
194
Bellia, supra note 166, at 990. Similarly, Professor Parmet has suggested that when
Congress chooses to regulate state-court procedures for hearing state-law claims, “the particular type of federal intrusion envisioned, although more subtle than outright preemption, may be especially onerous for the states.” Parmet, supra note 169, at 10.
195
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982).
196
505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
197
Id. at 175.
198
Id. at 176.
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tort claims and follow the federally-prescribed procedures, or cease to
hear such claims altogether. Because Congress could validly impose
the latter result, it arguably could force a state to choose between that
result and some procedural regulation.
3. A Weaker Case: Giving FDA Determinations Binding Effect
Up to this point, the hypothetical legislation has required referral
of certain issues (arising in state-court tort suits) to the FDA, but has
provided that the FDA’s determination of those issues is non-binding.
If the legislation instead required state courts to refer such issues to
the FDA and to give the resulting FDA determinations binding effect,
the latter requirement would call the legislation’s validity into serious
question. FERC did not approve any and all types of federal regulation; instead, FERC stressed that PURPA merely required state commissions to consider the relevant federal standards.199 Thus, even if the
greater power to preempt includes some lesser power to regulate procedure without preempting substance, it is likely that the Court would
set bounds on that principle.
We can discern one such bound by reference to the analysis in
Part II, where we saw that the primary-jurisdiction mechanism would
be valid in federal court only if the FDA’s determinations were, at
most, prima facie evidence; otherwise, the mechanism would violate
the Seventh Amendment. Although the Seventh Amendment does
not apply in state court, it is problematic to argue that Congress can
accomplish a result in state-court litigation that the Seventh Amendment would ban in federal-court litigation. In another context, the
Court has noted the incongruity of suggesting that the federal government might “wield greater power in the state courts than in its own
judicial instrumentalities.”200 Notably, in none of the cases where the
Court approved a federal statute that dictated arguably procedural
measures to the state courts did the statute in question assert a power
over state-law claims in state-court proceedings that Congress could
not also have asserted over federal-law claims in federal-court proceedings.201 Removing key issues from the purview of state juries would
dramatically restructure the states’ chosen allocation of decision-making authority and should be impermissible in light of the fact that the
199
See FERC, 456 U.S. at 764–65; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 926 (“In FERC, we construed
the most troubling provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to contain only the ‘command’ that state agencies ‘consider’ federal standards, and again only as
a precondition to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted field.”).
200
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712, 752 (1999) (holding that Article I does not
empower Congress to abrogate state immunity from private suits for damages in state
court).
201
See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 464–65 (2003); Pierce County v. Guillen,
537 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2003); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984).
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Seventh Amendment would bar a similar arrangement in federal
court.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it seems likely that Congress can require courts to
apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to state-law products liability
claims only if courts treat the FDA’s determination of the referred
factual issues as, at most, prima facie evidence. The fact that courts
could not give the FDA’s determinations binding effect does not rob
the primary jurisdiction doctrine of all potential significance in this
field. To the extent that the Supreme Court ultimately rejects arguments for outright preemption of state-law tort claims concerning
FDA-approved products, advocates of preemption would likely prefer
a primary-jurisdiction mechanism—even one that promises only nonbinding FDA determinations—to the current tort system, in which
FDA input comes largely through ad hoc submissions in the form of
amicus briefs. Conversely, opponents of preemption, who view litigation as a necessary backstop to FDA oversight and who are skeptical of
the FDA’s decision making, would likely oppose application of such a
primary-jurisdiction doctrine for the same reasons that they oppose
outright preemption. Professor O’Reilly’s Response to this Article
gives a forceful summary of the latter skeptical position,202 and—as I
discussed in a prior article—I share many of his concerns.203
My goal in writing this Article, however, was not to weigh those
questions of policy, but rather to address the doctrinal question of the
constitutional constraints on the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. In filling that gap in the doctrinal literature, this Article has also considered an interesting example of the limits on the
notion that greater powers include lesser ones. It may seem ironic
that more serious constitutional difficulties would arise from use of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine than from outright preemption of
state-law products liability claims. If Congress has the power to preempt, why should it not also have the power to require binding determinations by the FDA on certain challenging factual issues such as
product safety and causation?
As to federal-court litigation, though, the greater-powers argument rings hollow. Congress’s power to preempt a state-law claim carries with it no power to override the dictates of Article III and the
Seventh Amendment when a federal court hears the claim. And even
202

See O’Reilly, supra note 69.
See Struve, supra note 5, at 594–606 (discussing flaws in the FDA’s system for
postmarketing surveillance); id. at 648–50 (noting the possibility of bias in FDA decision
making); id. at 663–66 (emphasizing the importance of the litigation discovery process for
bringing safety information to light).
203
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as to state-court litigation, the greater-powers argument goes only so
far. The Constitution does not permit Congress to impose on state
courts hearing state-law claims strictures that it could not impose on
federal courts hearing such claims.204 This is particularly true in the
light of the respect that Congress owes to the state courts as loci of
state sovereignty.205

204
205

See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
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